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In their detailed and well-argued exposition,
van Os and Reininghaus1 identify and substantiate
major problems in the intellectual structures that
underpin psychiatry. In particular, by reviewing the
recent great advances in our knowledge of
psychotic conditions, they raise important
questions about the relationship between
psychiatric phenomena and defined diagnostic
categories. They propose a solution that involves a
radical remodelling of this relationship. I have
considerable sympathy with their position and their
arguments, so this commentary is by way of
providing additional conceptual context and setting
out the implications for advances in research
strategies.
The lay concept of madness is common to
virtually every society and language group. Thus,
certain individuals may be identified by consensus
as being in consistent, persistent and idiosyncratic
error, often linked to actions perceived as
incomprehensible or deeply inappropriate. The
recognition that such people required help rather
than exorcism or punishment meant that the
phenomena of madness gradually came to be seen
as the province of physicians, leading to important
and enduring changes in the way these phenomena
were studied. Specific aspects of madness became
codified as the key symptoms of delusions
(erroneous thinking) and hallucinations (erroneous
perceptions), and these came to be seen as signs of
one or more diseases.
Because it encapsulates the idea of disease,
diagnostic classification is the central feature of the
medical approach. As a branch of medicine,
psychiatry was similarly built around the
formulation of diagnostic categories. The division of
ill-health into categories is based on the belief that
this will ultimately enable the rational allotment of
treatments. Disease classes (syndromes) are
constructed when diligent observation identifies
groups of people whose ill-health is associated with
consistent and distinguishable features, that is,
specific symptoms and signs. In this view, disease
classes are theoretical constructs which then
provide the basis for testing theories of aetiology,
pathology, treatment, course and outcome2. When
the theories based on them are corroborated (as
they often have been in general medicine), the
aetiology or pathology associated with the
syndromes may consequently take over as
classifiers.
The construction of a disease category creates
a conceptual shift. The category is thereby held to
reflect an underlying disease process and so comes
to be accorded an implicit causal function: it
becomes the cause of the symptoms by which it is
recognized. The disease process in turn is held to be
the result of some fundamental cause, which may
be extraneous (e.g., microbial, toxic or other
physical factors) or constitutional (genetic, or
genetic-environmental). This transposition in
scientific focus is seen equally in physical and
mental disorders. While it is a rational strategy, its
success is not guaranteed.
However, disease classes are hostage to
empirical evidence: their acceptance should
therefore always be tentative, and they may be
revised or abandoned in the light of new
information (for this reason it is dangerous to
accord them an intrinsic reality3,4). The revision of
disease categories has been a particular
characteristic of psychiatric classification. Indeed,
the emergence of psychosis as a preferred term in
research over the last 20 years reflects
dissatisfaction with narrower categorizations:
affective psychosis, schizoaffective disorder and
schizophrenia. This was particularly driven by the
realization that virtually all psychotic disorder
involves affective changes and, quite probably,
similar affective mechanisms. While to purists the
term psychosis may appear like an imprecise catch-
all, the flexibility it allows has certainly contributed
to an increased knowledge of the conditions
covered.
Once categories are agreed, the process of
diagnosis depends on categorical judgements that
individuals meet or fail to meet the requirements
for membership. In psychiatry, our continuing
ignorance of any causal correlates sufficient to
justify an aetiology-based classification means that
we are left defining classes in terms of symptoms.
This is what creates the situation addressed by van
Os and Reininghaus1. In particular, a hierarchical
element has traditionally been central to
psychiatric classification. Thus, schizophrenic
disorders are defined in terms of the presence, at
some stage, of psychotic symptoms. In their
absence, the diagnosis cannot be made; in their
presence, the diagnosis will be made irrespective of
other psychological symptoms. Schneider’s first
rank symptoms of schizophrenia are much vaunted
in clinical psychiatry, but their significance lies in
the fact that they are regarded as prima facie
2indicators of schizophrenia, whatever the other
psychiatric symptoms individuals might have. We
choose to place schizophrenia at the apex of the
psychiatric diagnostic hierarchy, for the perfectly
good reason that it corresponds to the layperson’s
idea of madness, the psychiatric problem
associated with most distress and dysfunction.
However, although it is reasonably
straightforward to identify key symptoms like
delusions and hallucinations, problems do arise. In
particular, there are dimensional issues even with
categorically defined symptoms. Thus, there is a
(rational) reticence to diagnose a psychotic disorder
if the psychotic symptoms are only experienced
rarely, or occur singly, especially if the person is
undisturbed by them and has insight. Thus,
psychotic symptoms may sometimes be identified
in people who fall below diagnostic thresholds,
what van Os and Reininghaus call the extended
phenotype. In practice, many people have a few
symptoms, while only a few have many5.
As van Os and Reininghaus demonstrate in
their review, a minor degree of psychotic
symptomatology may be present in a range of other
disorders, most notably affective disorder. In their
terminology, these psychotic symptoms are
transdiagnostic. To some extent, transdiagnostic
symptomatology is an inevitable consequence of
the rules placing psychosis high in the diagnostic
hierarchy. It is well established that affective
symptoms are widespread in the general
population6, thus they are at least equally likely to
appear in people with a diagnosis of psychosis.
However, the interesting point, well substantiated
by van Os and Reininghaus, is that the level of
affective disturbance in people with psychosis is far
higher than in the general population.
All in all, the evidence therefore suggests that
there is no such thing as an event horizon in
psychosis, and this must be taken into account in
attempts to determine its causation. In fact, it
encourages a productive paradigm shift, away from
the idea that disorders cause symptoms. It fosters a
view of transdiagnostic symptoms and associated
psychological attributes as elements in potential
causal chains, possibly linking external experience
with the emergence of particular psychotic
symptoms7. It then becomes possible to examine
the interrelationship of social environmental
factors and the internal features of psychosis. This
endeavour is furthered by analysing symptoms in
terms of correlates that are likely to influence them
in distinctive ways. There is good evidence of this
sort of multiple influence in paranoia, which is
characteristically associated with a worry thinking
style, negative thoughts about the self, increased
interpersonal sensitivity, anomalous internal
experiences, insomnia, and various anomalous
styles of reasoning8-10. As a consequence,
transdiagnostic symptoms provide rational targets
for psychological therapy in psychosis.
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